Federal law governing the contempt power of the United States Courts is disorganized, cluttered, and poorly drafted. The lack of consolidation within and between various sources of federal legal authority is a critical problem. Contempt provisions lie scattered in piecemeal form across the entire breadth of the United States Code. Contempt provisions comprising federal common law likewise lie scattered across five separate sets of judicial rules of practice and procedure, covering five separate subject areas, using five separate numerologies: these rules govern bankruptcy procedure, appellate procedure, civil procedure, criminal procedure, and evidence. The high volume and lack of coordination between these interrelated authorities needlessly complicate contempt litigation. The objectives of this article are therefore to comprehensively survey the authorities governing contempt power and rectify their defects.

A. Overview of Contempt Law
The power to punish disrespect and disobedience through contempt proceedings is inherent to the judicial power and implied under Article III of the United States Constitution. There are two important distinctions mediating this power. The first distinction is between criminal contempt and civil contempt. Criminal contempt is contempt of a court’s dignity. Civil contempt is disobedience of a court’s order, rule, or judgment. Criminal contempt and civil contempt are not mutually exclusive categories; they often overlap. An act of disobedience can insult a court’s dignity; an insult against a court’s dignity can arise from an act of disobedience.

The second distinction is between direct contempt and constructive contempt. Direct contempt occurs within a court’s presence, that is, within the proximity of the presiding tribunal. Constructive contempt occurs beyond the proximity of the courthouse. All direct contempt is criminal. Constructive contempt can be criminal, civil, or both.

B. Defects in Contempt Law
The Strategic Plan for the Federal Judiciary declares seven core values: rule of law, equal justice, judicial independence, diversity and respect, accountability, excellence, and service. Federal contempt law does not reflect these values. The scope of the contempt power of the United States Courts is not clearly expressed in federal contempt authorities for four reasons. First, there is no statute that comprehensively governs civil contempt.

Second, the principal statute governing criminal contempt, 18 U.S.C. § 401, is defective. It does not adequately declare, for example, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt procedures or what penalties are liable upon conviction for criminal contempt.

Third, there is a lack of clarity about whether bankruptcy judges possess contempt power.

Fourth, judicial rules governing contempt procedures are poorly organized. There are multiple sets of contempt rules governing different courts with different jurisdictions. There is a lack of coordination between contempt provisions within these sets of rules. There is also a lack of coordination between these different sets of rules. These defects undermine the uniformity, simplicity, and efficiency of federal practice and procedure as a whole.

C. Reforming Contempt Law
I propose to systematically improve federal contempt law in three ways. First, I propose to improve the statutory regime for contempt procedures by eliminating redundancy between criminal contempt statutes and passing legislation that explicitly gives bankruptcy courts contempt power.

Second, I propose new rules and rule amendments to streamline contempt procedures for the United States Supreme Court, United States Courts of Appeals, United States District Courts, specialty courts, territorial courts, and administrative courts.

Third, I propose to nationalize local contempt rules derived from specific courts with local contempt provisions that deserve to be replicated. Simplification of contempt provisions at one level of authority generates a cascade of improvements by eliminating the need for similar provisions at others. An improved nationwide rule can eliminate the need for needlessly complicating local derivations. If a nationwide rule says more, moreover, a statute should say less. Improvements to nationwide rules of practice and procedure, in other words, eliminate superfluous and needlessly complicating local derivations and statutory counterparts.

D. Roadmap for this Article
Part II of this article explains the interbranch process for generating federal judicial rules of practice and procedure. It recounts how the federal government created contempt provisions at the inception of the interbranch rulemaking process in order to provide historical perspective. It also explains in more detail how the four defects I identified in contemporary federal contempt law undermine the efficacy of contempt procedures in federal courts.5 Part III of this article provides precise instructions for implementing my three overarching proposals for reforming federal contempt law. Part IV concludes. Parts V – IX are appendices containing strikethrough copies of authorities currently comprising federal contempt law along with my proposed reforms and revisions. Parts IX – XV are appendices containing clean copies of authorities comprising federal contempt law in its current form. The appendices in Parts V – XV serve both as specific references for my proposals in this article as well as general references for practitioners and judges engaged in contempt proceedings. I encourage the reader to turn back and forth between each proposal and the appendix containing its respective authority revised according to my proposed specifications. The footnotes in each section of each part of this article cross-reference the particular appendices relevant to each proposal.